Final Project

For my final project I'm writing a series of short dialogues. I've been very interested about using a dialogical medium through which to convey philosophy, and also the different ways within dialogue we can express ideas and develop them; think, for instance, the very different narrative structure of Republic, Theaetetus, Berkley, or even the plays we are currently reading. 

While these could all be considered in some sense, dialogues, they are really quite different in certain literary respects. First person narration of Republic, Socrates as a possibly unreliable narrator, the temporal and character distance we see in Theaetetus, or the straight up style of Berkley. Playwrights even push these boundaries by incorporating other vehicles to convey meaning, such as physical sets, director notes (or the lackthereof) and so on. 

When looking at the minutia of dialogue as a medium, we can see just how flexible and different two works, both ostensibly dialogues, can be. The series I'm working on will employ a wide variety of these narrative structures in an effort to approach ideas and character development differently, although the philosophical content and the characters themselves will appear in every dialogue. 

Plato vs. Hume: Character Depth

As we have noticed thus far, Hume's characters in his dialogues, namely Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea, are all more complex and less like mouthpieces than the characters of Berkley.

One thing I have noticed, however, is despite this depth, certain behaviors of Hume's characters do not connote the same level of profundity as that of Plato's characters. There is plenty of implied meaning behind, for example, Cephalus leaving the room in Book One of Republic, or implied conversion of Glaucon in Book Nine.

Why is this so? It is true that there is certain level of societal satire in Plato that doesn't seem to be present in Hume. We also know a good deal of historical biographical information about many of Plato's interlocutors that gives the characters perhaps a more authentic depth than that of fictional ones, at least in the case of Hume, and certainly Berkley. Moreover, there is also an omniscient tension in Plato's dialogues--almost all of them contain a hero that everyone listening or reading (even in the time of Plato) now knows to have been executed.

Given these added layers, the depth of Plato's interlocutors is much greater than that of Cleanthes, for example, yet is it even fair to compare the two?

'The Machine' on the Self and biological continuity

Our discussion on the star trek metaphysics in class reminded me of a philosophy comic that encapsulates the basic arguments surrounding the idea that we don't have biological continuity, and what that means with respect to the self.

'Comic,' per say, only refers to the medium of 'The Machine,' as it is much longer and dramatic, as opposed to shorter and comedic. In any event I think it illustrates the thought experiment quite well.

Hopefully this post, in conjunction with my last one, can spark more conversation about our collaborative effort to put our arguments on paper. 

http://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

Enjoy!

Berkley, Idealism, and Materialism

In class last Tuesday we had an discussion on the consequences (or not) of accepting the materialistic worldview--does it or does it not imply a deterministic one?

I thought our response was the best I've heard today, so I think it would be a good idea if I attempted to reconstruct it, and then everyone's comments, corrections, and criticisms could formulate a strong and tangible theory. I apologize for the length of the blog (I try to keep them short) but this one demanded a little more detail.

Here are the backbones of our discussion, as I remember it:

Does materialism force us to concede to a totally deterministic worldview?

That causal forces of the material world are in a sense, predetermined because everything that happens in the 'external' world is caused by an efficacious predecessor. Therefore, if we acknowledge that our minds are no less part of the materialistic world than a chair or table, we must admit the predetermined nature of all human behavior as well.

Responses: 

-We can accept that internalist-externalist dualism with respect to our minds is largely false, while at the same time recognizing the difference between our 'minds,' whatever that may be, and our brain, basically, the biological content of our physical bodies.

-Moreover, whatever we may define as our 'mind,' we may assert that it is an emergent property of our consciousness, our sociality, and so on, and at the very least, we maintain that mind is distinct from brain, and the latter is what is demonstrably linked to the external world simply by virtue of existing in it.

-This distinction allows us to refute the criticism that the contents of our minds are predetermined by the causal, external world--at best we can say that the external world, like any existing object or idea or thing, influences the mind, which is hardly binding in any deterministic way.

-The mind originates from the brain, which is part of the materialistic world, yet as an emergent property in some sense creates a new dimension to it--therefore the causality of the materialistic world does not become more complex, but rather, the mind expands causality to the point at which we can either refine the term or choose another one.

For example, imagine the causal forces of the physical, materialist world to be projected on a standard line graph, with an 'X' and a 'Y' axis. The emergent property of the mind, rather than existing on the graph, as say, the biological brain does, adds a third dimension to the graph, and thus prevents determinism from charting our 'predetermined' actions, on the original graph.

Finally, I would add that this argument in no way eliminates all elements of determinism in our lives; it merely refutes the challenge that materialism necessitates holistic determinism.

I've probably made some errors or omissions along the way, so I look forward to your comments!

Digression in Theaetetus

I was thinking about the digression in the Theaetetus that we discussed on Tuesday. It seemed that the allusion to the Republic, among other things, pointed to the fact that the potential of some knowledge was what differentiated Socratic skepticism with Protagorean relativism, and that these questions were important, not just to Socrates and star geometry students like Theaetetus, but to everyone.

Perhaps this point was the intent of the digression, and why Plato has Theodorus remark to Socrates that he followed and understood the digression much better. The conversations that Socrates and Theaetetus have may not be understood by all, but we all can certainly try, for the ramifications of their discussions affect us all.

Convoluted Passages in Theaetetus

In class today I brought up a hypothetical--that perhaps a way in which many Greeks listened to Plato's dialogues were in similar fashion to that of Euclides and Terpison in Theatetus. At the very least, Plato is telling us that some did.

The passage at 192 is one particularly sophisticated argument that I was referring to, and it seems to have lost even Theatetus. The possibility that Euclides and Terpison probably only heard this read aloud, and one time through, I think, gives an added meaning to aporia in Plato's dialogues. The confusion is not only induced in the characters, but surely a once through would have left most Athenians in a similar state of aporia, though certainly a different kind of confusion than the type that we encounter, after reading the dialogue over and over again. Thoughts?

The Dramatic Setting of Theaetetus

We talked at length today about Plato's reason for instituting the outer dialogue as a route to the inner one, and I'll present a theory I've taken the time to flesh out a little more. I want to tentatively argue that Plato creates a strong parallel between Socrates and Theatetus--the outer dialogue only makes this argument stronger.

To begin with, our interlocutors in the outer dialogue are Terpsion and and Euclides. Both are from Megara, and both have a vested interest in Socrates--they were both present at his execution (Phaedo, 59c). 

The time at which Terpsion and Euclides read the dialogue is at the death of Theatetus, and subsequently, the actual conversation took place just before the death of Socrates. Theatetus, like Socrates, has similar physical characteristics, laudable intelligence and character, and contains the same modesty with respect to knowledge and willingness to admit it in conjunction with an eagerness to learn more. Socrates clearly enjoys his conversations with Theatetus as well--his demeanor is very different from the Socrates that talks to Euthyphro outside the courthouse shortly thereafter. Moreover, both Socrates and Theatetus die courageous deaths at the hands of Athens, Socrates by Athenian grand jury, and Theatetus in fighting for Athens. 

There seems to be a good deal of evidence that suggests Plato's efforts to draw our attentions to the similarities between Theatetus and Socrates, especially in light of both the outer and inner dialogues taking place at the time of their respective deaths. Thoughts?

Teaching as Improvisation

We talked for a bit Tuesday about teaching as improvisation. I think this highlights two things about teaching that I think could be interesting to discuss. Does thinking of teaching as an improvisational art 1) employ an art to teaching that can be improved, like that of a musician's and 2) entail some degree of natural talent?

Obviously, teaching in this sense can be improved at intervals, but if it is like this art, then is it likely that some people are or could be better teachers than others?

Political Theory and Pedagogy

In our classes this week, we talked about student autonomy.  Various pedagogical practices, such as calling on a student without their permission, or structuring the class in ways that force, compel, or conduce student participation. Can we form a coherent pedagogical theory of student autonomy through the western liberalism political philosophical model?

In other words, can we use concepts like autonomy, consent, state of nature (outside the class) and civil society (inside the class) as conceptual models for a fair and just approach to the relationship between students and teachers?

PE: Socratic Inclusion

We talked today at length of Seigel's concept of epistemological inclusion, or rather, his distinction between the soundness of conclusions of any epistemological framework and the morality of inclusion/exclusion.

After Greg's evocation of Socrates, I thought it interesting that, with respect to inclusion, Socrates is an exemplary model.  Moreover, Seigel specifically cites Socrates and the Socratic tradition and search for truth as his idea of philosophy--it seems as though the symbol of the epistemologically driven tradition was also the same person who talked to everyone, regardless of class or social status, about the truth, or at least in search of it.

PE: Views of the Teacher

We talked at length today about the perceived dangers of teachers impressing their views on students.  While this tactic may make more sense at the undergraduate level, I would like to pose it as one that could apply to all grade levels--can a teacher mitigate the espousal of 'dangerous' views simply by being just another member of the class?

Obviously, there will always be a slight element of power difference when it comes to the student-teacher interaction within the classroom.  With that being said, if a teacher simply poses questions, and entertains viewpoints in such a way that suggests they exist independent of everyone in the room, which they do logically speaking, then were is the danger of impressing a view point?  And moreover, it seems that teachers can still direct conversation and refute illogical view points while acting as a student or moderator, and not the sole possessor of these views.  Thoughts?

Critical Thinking in the Arts

In testing Siegel's claim that critical thinking is paramount in education, we soon began discussing whether or not one can or should think critically about the arts--one point I was trying to make in class, though possibly couldn't clarify, was the idea that while critical thinking is perhaps necessary for the pursuit of knowledge in some fields, it is quite possible to aesthetically enjoy music without thinking critically.

With that being said, the arts certainly contain the capability and room for the critical thinker.  It is quite possible to enjoy art without this aspect, yet I don't think this is relevant to Siegel's claim: as long as the capability within art for the critical thinker exists, then I think we can accept Siegel's claim comfortably, without having to endanger subjects like music, or any of the arts.

PE: Manipulation via Acting

When we see a play, movie, or read piece of literature, we constantly dissect characters in the ensuing conversation.  In fact, it was through literary creation which made famous the idea of the unreliable narrator, or the instrumental use (or misuse) of certain characters to prove a point in the broader narrative of the lesson.

In class on Thursday, we discussed the idea that teaching more actively defined as acting may increase the effectiveness of manipulation or telling the noble lie to students, because those students may be more inclined to question the words of the teacher as an actor, rather than as a person they are hierarchically linked to.  Thoughts?

PE: The Teacher of Emile

Seeing as I was not in class Thursday, I thought I might raise a question about the reading, and perhaps you may have answers tempered by the discussion in class.

How does the teacher in Emile differ from the Philosopher Ruler in the Allegory of the Cave?

Emile is quoted in the packet stating (roughly) that he would like to continue to be the person molded by the teacher; as is part of Rousseau's concept of education as a 'denaturing process.'  Emile is even quoted later to have considered retaining his teacher, so that he would always have the guidance he needs.

To me, this seems much a more paternalistic style of teaching than the Philosopher Ruler, who acts as more of a guide. While the molder of Emile is a teacher, the molder of the cave dweller is knowledge; the teacher merely exposes him or her to it.  Thoughts?

Allegory of the Cave

Something I wished to elaborate more in class to day was the (in my opinion) relevance of the allegory to Teacher/Student relationship.

We talked at length about Socrates' perhaps over exaggerating the importance of math, and on the dramatic level, all but refuting his dialogical opposition to poetry.  With that being said, surely the role of the philosopher and the cave-dweller can shed some light on the learning process and the relationship between the student and the teacher.  For example, the presence of a teacher with not only appropriate knowledge (of outside the cave) but also the ability to relate to the student (knowledge of the shadows).

Moreover, as we have already discussed, the process of learning involves not the passive reception of knowledge by the student, but his or her transformation--this idea points to the teacher as more of a guide and facilitator, rather than the administer of facts; in this way, the philosopher guiding the dweller out of the cave fits this mold as well.

Thrasymachus on the Dramatic Level

In class today the presence, or rather lack thereof, of Thrasymachus, presents an interesting question, especially from the literary perspective on character development in the Republic.

In Book I, Thrasymachus is clearly a powerful force, as Socrates alludes to in his descriptions.  Of course, one can doubt that Socrates was actually frightened of Thrasymachus, but surely it is reasonable to assume that he was at least a forceful and obstinate counterpart to Socrates.  Moreover, unlike Adeimantus, Polemarcus, and Glaucon, Thrasymachus has already chosen a career, quite successfully, as a sophist.

With that being said, why does he vanish from the dialogues?  He virtually disappears, and through books II-VI, only chimes in with the other three briefly once, merely to agree with the others, and then later in Book VI Socrates jokingly evokes his name, although there is no response by Thrasymachus himself.

Clearly, Plato establishes Thrasymachus as someone whose presence in the room is necessary, for indeed there is no mention of his leaving the room at all after Book I, and furthermore, Plato establishes the character of Thrasymachus as a bold and ambitious sophist, also in the first book.  How does his disappearance in the later books explain this?  It seems as though the Thrasymachus we had come to know in Book I would surely not sit idly by throughout the many conversations had by Socrates, Adeimantus, Polemarcus, and Glaucon.

Thoughts?

PE: The Incentive of Glaucon

In book IV of The Republic, Socrates clearly calls the motives of Glaucon in question.  In other words, Socrates attacks his inner assumptions about the truth, in his poignant view, that the truth is something easily hidden from the soul.  In fact, Socrates seems to counter the view of Glaucon, that a lie to the soul, when resting in the latter, is detrimental to the person.  Now, when Socrates poses the idea that the lie within the soul (the lie resting in the soul) is actually the worst form of the lie, Glaucon, who seems to, by Plato's dramatic interpretation of Glaucon's character, disagree fundamentally with this statement by Socrates, ends up agreeing with him wholeheartedly.

I think, for the purposes of this class, the 'classroom' medium that Socrates utilizes to draw out the vocal thinking processes of Glaucon is one that often times produces the answer most logically desirable, whereas, an atmosphere like a lecture hall or a correspondence course would not.  Socrates is able to draw out logical conclusions from Glaucon in this medium in particular, which could say something for the dynamic of the Socratic classroom; one which might serve teachers well in classes specifically involving active student discussion.

PE: A Common Process

To begin, I just want to say that I look forward to our class this year.  I think one common thread we've drawn this far is the emphasis on the process of interaction of students and teacher as vital to education.  This process is something quite evident in the rising and falling of arguments in the Republic; I think the process, with respect to it's dialogical nature, is something that we can employ in in our class as well.

LE: Lincoln and Human Nature

Often times, human nature is revealed people during times of hardship.  I think, (and this is just speculation) that perhaps the hardships that Lincoln went through growing up resulted in a man that knew his own character quite well, and understood the character of others quite well also.

This explains the lack of grudge holding, the patience, and sympathy towards many people and groups of people that we may find surprising, such as the Southern lifestyle, his cabinet members, generals, etc.

Thoughts?

LE: Miller and the Culture of Morality in American Politics

When reading the chapter on Miller, and seeing the stance of the Liberty Party in the election of Clay vs. Polk, their moral reasoning cost Clay the election.  This was certainly not the only time that a third party cost the election for the party that it actually had more in common with.

The idea that "morally speaking," one should not vote for a given candidate, for reason 'x,' and (supposing this person is against reasons x,y, and z) causing a different candidate of whom supports reasons x,y, and z (and not just x, as the given candidate did) seems to be a deeply flawed concept, which places more emphasis on deflecting personal responsibility (wiping the hands clean, if you will) than actually acting in a way that ensures the greatest moral outcome, relative to the voter's moral system.

I think Miller, in dissecting the moral argument of the Liberty Party, via Licoln's original argument, unearths an important aspect of American Politics; that is seems, the only way to introduce a 'moral' theory, or idea into a party platform involves great oversimplification, and inevitably, ruins the moral principle that originated the idea.

It seems that most politicians do not attempt to integrate any sort of complex moral reasoning into a party platform, because it either cannot be digested by the average voter, or because it can easily be taken out of context by political pundits.  Any 'moral' theory that survives this scrutiny becomes thwarted by simplification and quite often, becomes a prideful and dogmatic 'do' or 'do not' imperative.  Thoughts?