CLP: Judicial Restraint Redefined

I suggested in class today that looking at judicial restraint from a different perspective would help us see it as a more comprehensive and capable theory of adjudication.  In order to do this, we need to reject to common conceptions of judicial restraint-

1.  Judicial restraint is literally the opposite of judicial activism.
2.  Judicial restraint always defers to the will of the majority via the executive or legislative branches of government.

I think different conceptions of judicial restraint are merely fragmented in-articulations of treating law's primary function of protecting the democratic process- and I think the best prototype for the judicial restraint I am defining is Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Holmes exhibits classic restraint in his dissent in Lochner, refusing to endorse a given economic theory.  However, he became a famous advocate for free speech protection; his dissent in Abrams v. US protected free speech by actively rebuking the power of congress through the Espionage Act.  Some see Holmes' judicial restraint become inconsistent when looking at his free speech opinions.  I see his opinions as embracing a more robust version of judicial restraint.

Holmes' jurisprudence is not a restraint from the will of the majority;  his restraint lies in keeping his judicial power from infringing upon the democratic process.