Thursday, April 4, 2013

CLP: Tolerance in Mill and Devlin

Both Mill and Devlin include the theme of tolerance in their writings- Mill uses tolerance as means for extending the individual rights of others, while Devlin uses tolerance as a means through which a society progresses, or digresses, through a change in public opinion on moral issues.

With that being said, both have different outlooks on society.  Mill puts faith in generational progress.  Moral issues are either assimilated into law by the ensuing generation, or they are simply recycled into the following generation with a more accurate and empathetic educational process, from parent/guardian to child.  Devlin, on the other hand, views generational progression as possibly negative- that progression does not necessarily change moral acceptance, but merely bolsters the tolerance in which immoral acts are publicly committed.

My question is this- does Devlin's view of generational progression in morality really differ that much from the positive one of Mill?  Or, perhaps, does his argument through gay and lesbian rights unfairly polarize and twist his methods of reasoning?

3 comments:

  1. To your first question, I think both Mill and Devlin are similar insofar as accepting the change in belief from generation to generation. To your second question, I think Devlin may have picked a poor example to advance his ideas because gay/lesbian ridgts are so sensitive. We simply have to accept that he was a victim of his time period.

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  2. It seems that where these two theories differ is about the meaning of the word progress being inherently good, for Mill I think that he would view acceptance of homosexuality adding to the aggregate good of a society. Devlin would argue that homosexuality being tolerated and accepted is infringing on the institutions of marriage and on the common decency of society at large

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    Replies
    1. Yes; they seem to disagree about the value of this intergenerational development. But Devlin's position begs the question of what precisely is immoral about homosexuality (and he begins by acknowledging that we can't fault people for exercising their right to disbelief in theological claims...).

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