Today in class, I asked the question:
Does Honore's refutation of Nozick serve as a strong, logical argument for commonly shared natural resources, and a substitute for the similar conclusion reached by theologically based assertion of John Locke?
Nozick's presuppositions on acquisition and of property are not justified, nor are they based in an objective claim about the nature of labor and natural goods. Honore, in short, says that Nozick's theory lacks not only moral high ground, but historical accuracy as well.
1. Moral Contention: Nozick's theory states that ownership of property is not only completely exclusive, yet indefinite. This would not allow for consensual transfers of property. In other words, if the original acquisition of property by a person involves consensus from a society, than it would make sense that good intentions come with that agreement, hence, the availability of certain proviso's that Locke suggests, and much more robust ones (than Nozicks's interpretation of them). Nozick does indeed comment on the impossibility of everyone in a given society to consent to one's acquisition of a product, especially one that has until recently been hidden from discovery. However, if one begins with the premise that all natural goods are commonly shared by all, than would not tacit agreements suffice? In this event, acquisition would be accompanied by the subsequent assumptions that the eventual property would be utilized in its entirety, provisos included, of course.
2. Historical Accuracy: Honore suggests that Nozick's core premises, discussed earlier, are based in Roman Law, through the lens of western societal bias. Why shouldn't societies which are closer to nature be examined for their own treatment of property? Honore makes a compelling case for some eastern oriental societies, and some older pre-European American societies in which property is very much viewed similarly to Locke's theory of commonly shared goods.
As I understand Honore, one of his main premises, or fundamental principles, asserts that we are not isolated beings, I think this is key. Honore's fishhook example posits an inherently distributive and participatory system of private property that assumes, as a main premise, that people are comparatively worse off when denied something, usage or actual, that they may otherwise not have discovered on their own. I think this is right. Honore's, suggestion that a person suffers a wrong when treated as an unequal might not yield positive economic results (as he points out) but demands that we examine our ethical social framework from a different perspective. And reminds us, I think, as Matt pointed out, that economic prosperity need not be linked to moral behavior and in fact might be absent of any such considerations.
ReplyDeleteI think Honore's position might better account for the current division of labor while emphasizing the importance of an intervening authority to necessitate fairness, or sharing. Locke's argument that God commanded us to subdue, and appropriate the resources of the earth requires our labor -- private possessions are the results of our labor, but this might not rely on theological assumptions. Both arguments may rest on the reasonableness of our actions. How might Locke interpret cases of human ingenuity, e.g., the fishhook? Is Honore right to suggest that the inventor of the fishhook is entitled to a greater share?
ReplyDeleteNice question -- perhaps the inventor's reward is social approbation and appreciation, plus the satisfaction of having made life a little easier for herself and others (these are the things that make for better quality of life anyway). Maybe a greater share is uncalled for.
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