Raz on Regimes

In our class discussion on Tuesday, we brought up the question of the idea of liberal regimes.  I think it is safe to say that most people would consider the United States to be a "liberal" regime, in Raz's sense of the definition.  However, I think we came up with a few examples that found contradiction with the assumed notion of Raz's that Liberal states always protected the right of "political participation," such as voter reg. laws, ect.

My question is this- if we are open to the possibility that, in the United States, it is possible to experience an infringement upon one's political participation, does it follow that the United States is an illiberal state?  It seems to me that there could be a few answers to this.  Firstly, one could accept under Raz that the United States is an illiberal regime.  Secondly, one could accept that the inconsistency in this case lies not with the US, or any state, but with Raz's definition of liberal and illiberal being to cut and dry.

This would open up the possibility of accepting that perhaps Liberal states do indeed occasionally have illiberal laws, that need to be corrected.  In this new scenario, one now must also question whether or not Raz's claim, that civil disobedience in of itself is never justified in a liberal regime, is still consistent with his concepts of statehood.  With that being said, it seems that if the second conclusion is drawn, it may be better to go back to the drawing board instead of patching up the original theory.