Purity in Nonviolent Resistance

We've often discussed how the puritanical aspect of Gandhian nonviolent resistance is lost on most of the similar movements today..so my question is this:  Is this due to the actors (like Gandhi, or absence thereof) or the circumstances?

In other words, one pragmatic advantage to Gandhian style nonviolent resistance was the aspect of the moral purity of the movement, in the way that it changed the world's perception of the British Empire.  Once the world saw that the British Empire was not in India for humanitarian reasons, everything changed.  However, I think we see most cases of nonviolent resistance differently today.  Even if we (the US) do not intervene in a situation, it is not because we think the current power is actually doing the right thing.  The majority of Americans would readily condemn authoritarian regimes in which nonviolent, or even violent, resistance takes (or has taken) place, such as the likes of Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria.

These movements have nothing to gain by "exposing" the regime for what it truly is, as Gandhi did, because we simply already know the true nature of them.  Current global circumstances seem to take away one of the key pragmatic advantages to Gandhian style nonviolent resistance.  However, I'm sure that some would disagree- that perhaps it is not circumstance, merely a lack of morally driven people given the opportunity such as Gandhi was.  Furthermore, I think this question in particular lies under the umbrella of the debate of nonviolent resistance as a tool, versus a lifestyle.

Non-Violence and the International Community

Despite the the growing evidence in support of the effectiveness of non-violent campaigns, sometimes groups will grow frustrated with the lack of international attention they get, and resort to violence; for example, the rehashing of tensions in Israel have many Palestines, and many of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in support of the Palestinian run group, Hamas (seen as a terrorist org. by the US).  Hamas has been retaliating with violence, as they have in the past, and they have indeed received attention; whereas, the older, non-violent political organization, Fatah, has taken a back seat.  Violence was a key reason in the split of friendly ties between Hamas and Fatah in 2007, and it seems like the cooperation between these two influential powers will continue to be marred by the institution of violence in campaigning and resistance.

It seems to me that this is a problem that must be fixed, beginning not with organizations like Hamas, but the international community, including the UN, and several NGO's that fail to recognize and support the legitimacy of non-violent campaigns in their infancy.

Raz on Regimes

In our class discussion on Tuesday, we brought up the question of the idea of liberal regimes.  I think it is safe to say that most people would consider the United States to be a "liberal" regime, in Raz's sense of the definition.  However, I think we came up with a few examples that found contradiction with the assumed notion of Raz's that Liberal states always protected the right of "political participation," such as voter reg. laws, ect.

My question is this- if we are open to the possibility that, in the United States, it is possible to experience an infringement upon one's political participation, does it follow that the United States is an illiberal state?  It seems to me that there could be a few answers to this.  Firstly, one could accept under Raz that the United States is an illiberal regime.  Secondly, one could accept that the inconsistency in this case lies not with the US, or any state, but with Raz's definition of liberal and illiberal being to cut and dry.

This would open up the possibility of accepting that perhaps Liberal states do indeed occasionally have illiberal laws, that need to be corrected.  In this new scenario, one now must also question whether or not Raz's claim, that civil disobedience in of itself is never justified in a liberal regime, is still consistent with his concepts of statehood.  With that being said, it seems that if the second conclusion is drawn, it may be better to go back to the drawing board instead of patching up the original theory.

Haskar: Non-cooperation versus CD

In the Haskar reading, he pulls the example of the milk man strike, citing the milk man's justified employment for higher wages, even if it means the suffering of those who depend upon the milk.  In this case, Haskar argues that the need for the milk man to feed his (potentially starving) family with proper wages is justified in the end, despite the fact that others dependent upon the milk may suffer as a consequence to the strike.

Is this civil disobedience?  While Haskar does note that civil disobedience does need non-cooperation, although non-cooperation does not always need CD, I would definitely consider this example in particular to be non-cooperation; as their is no government or laws for the milk man to interact with.  Of course, one could argue the aim is legislation regarding higher pay laws, but, hypothetically, if the milk man were merely exercising his leverage as a valued employee, would this be CD and NC, or just NC? I personally think it is merely the latter.

CD: Essay Outline

During his thoughts and reasoning regarding the case against civil disobedience, Herbert J. Storing ultimately makes the assertions that civil disobedience is largely irrelevant to the issues of today.  He goes on to separate the concept of civil disobedience from that of provoking a test case via judicial review, and questions the integrity involved (alludes to violence) of this concept as well.  Herbert J. Storing's case against civil disobedience is flawed, int he definition he assigns to the concept, and the minimal implications and practicality he asserts that it has.

I've just given a rough outline of a few key/broader premises to my argument below.

-There seems to be an argument against the irrelevance of civil disobedience today, as the actions regarding the Arab Spring, symbolic federal tax evasion, and socioeconomic protests in many countries, including the United States.

-Civil disobedience is not in a fact a "transition" or "subordinate" to conventional political action or revolution; it is, in of itself, a medium through which laws are challenged.  This is given, of course, that "fidelity of law" is maintained, and other feasible, legal, options are explored.

-Operating, loose definition of Civil Disobedience, with these necessary (but not inclusive) conditions:
-A justified and nonviolent act.  (I will go indepth on my analysis of what it means to be justified, and nonviolent)
-An action involves members of said society, and a recipient. (their sovereign governing body)
-Maintains "fidelity of law."
-Conveys sincerity to fellow citizens. (fidelity and sincerity go hand in hand.)

CD: Testing the Common Conception of Justice

In Singer's reading, one of his base ideas conveys the assertion that a society with a common conception of justice does not require civil disobedience, because if that society did indeed have that common conception, nothing would need to be brought to it's attention.  My question is, can that common conception change?

Firstly, a common conception is by definition a common thought process or belief held by a large majority of the people of a certain society; hence, a common conception.  Furthermore, if the people in such a society are the ones that create such a common conception, then couldn't that common conception change with the addition or subtraction of persons?  Or, for instance, a scientific paradigm shift?

CD: What's Next?

In class today we discussed Rawls' statements on civil disobedience, being more than stopping at the court decision of a test trial.  I am now not so sure as to whether or not he was appealing to a characteristic of a good civilly disobedient person, or being more literal..with that being said, if a person is never finished promoting his or her, or their, cause, what is next?  This question seems easier to answer for some cases more than others.

What struck me as this being such a difficult question to answer was somewhat theoretical, yet quite feasible.  What would Keeler and Corner have done if their was no dispute over the land?  After Randy went to jail, and their house was auctioned off (successfully), they were still able to protest, given that there was no decision over the property, and/or the land belonged to the general public.  Either way, their occupation was completely legal.  If the new family had owned the property as well, what would Betsy and Randy have done?  I think this a very tough case, especially because the decision to avoid federal taxes will never leave one alone.  So long as they continue to resist, they will forever be evicted from whatever place they legally occupy, unless they live with friends or family.  It seems like an incredible and life consuming commitment, based in principle, much more so than the practicality or effectiveness of their decision to withhold federal taxes.

CD: Circularity in Protesting Injustice

After watching part of the film, An Act of Conscience, I was reminded of Thoreau's take on direct and indirect civil disobedience, and the persons obligated to take these actions.  Obviously, a refusal to pay income tax, to prevent that money from being used in war is an example of direct civil disobedience that Thoreau himself used.

I do admire Thoreau's commitment to direct civil disobedience, but I think his view that it is the only proper way to protest is wrong, for a simple reason.  In many cases, the person(s) being persecuted or suffering injustice are perfectly capable of taking effective actions to better their cause and seek change.  However, what of the more extreme cases of injustice?  Could slaves have protested slavery?  Could members of an ethnic group protest to their genocidal counterparts?  I think not. It seems to me that Thoreau's idea of leaving civil disobedience to the ones suffering the persecution stops short of the most deadly and heinous forms of social injustice.

CD: Civil Disobedience in a Civil Society

I was really intrigued about our conversations in class on Thursday concerning the "civil society."

I would stipulate that civil society is a product of cultural laws of the people, and laws of the government.  I would also stipulate that governmental law is all inclusive of pragmatic laws of the time period and area, as well as the fundamental laws that may exist in numerous, if not all just societies.

While I do not think we came to a definite conclusion, I personally think that civil disobedience cannot exist without a genuine civil society.  For example, the civil societies of many fascist regimes during WWII I would argue are fabricated, and forced.  They are not a melding of cultural and governmental law; they exist in a fake reality, where all laws are either enforced or not by an all powerful figurehead, or heads.  One might argue that the complete revolution sparked by Gandhi, which forced the English to abdicate their hold over India, was done in an improper civil society; I would disagree.  Just because the regime was overthrown, as opposed to reformed, does not mean that the past regime did not cultivate a genuine civil society within the country.  I would argue that the division and extension of power that comes with a colonial system almost insures at least some influence from the cultural laws and customs of the local people.

In conclusion, I think that civil disobedience is not possible without a civil society.  In the case of Jewish empathy during the holocaust, and others like it, I would say that this is simply, "disobedience."

CD: Socrates and Thoreau, Leaving Home?

Socrates and Thoreau both discussed various concepts of obeying/disobeying the law, the concept of laws and following them, and other paradigms of civil disobedience.

In The Crito, Socrates defends his decision to accept the punishment of the Athenian government as he is questioned by his longtime friend, Crito.  Socrates even goes as far as to say that he likes Athens enough that he has never considered moving to neighboring city-states with governments he prefers.

Thoreau never mentions the possibility of leaving the States for a territory with a better governing. With that being said, Thoreau was not really in the same position as Socrates, but I think it's worth considering the possibility that he may have left for a government that was more ideal.  While Thoreau seemed to be intent on clarifying the fact that he was strictly a reformer of the law (and not an anarchist, just as Socrates) I don't think he exemplifies the same love for his county (or city) as Socrates does.  Would he have left the States if there had been a nearby government with a structure he preferred?  I think it's worth considering.

CD: Introduction

Hey guys!

Just thought I'd introduce myself.  My name is Dominick Cooper, and I'm a sophomore here at MCLA.  I'm a Political Science and Philosophy double major, from Lewisburg, PA.

Growing up in Virginia, going to high school in central Pennsylvania, and being a Christian Catholic, I've been raised in a largely conservative atmosphere.  Upon attending MCLA, and attending philosophy classes here especially, I've really been exposed to different schools of thought.  I've found my experience at MCLA to be incredibly enriching so far, and I've found that above all things, being a well rounded individual (as far as schools of thought go) is possibly one of the most important foundations a scholar can have.  I've enjoyed the first week of class, and I look forward to the rest of the semester!!