Final Project

For my final project I'm writing a series of short dialogues. I've been very interested about using a dialogical medium through which to convey philosophy, and also the different ways within dialogue we can express ideas and develop them; think, for instance, the very different narrative structure of Republic, Theaetetus, Berkley, or even the plays we are currently reading. 

While these could all be considered in some sense, dialogues, they are really quite different in certain literary respects. First person narration of Republic, Socrates as a possibly unreliable narrator, the temporal and character distance we see in Theaetetus, or the straight up style of Berkley. Playwrights even push these boundaries by incorporating other vehicles to convey meaning, such as physical sets, director notes (or the lackthereof) and so on. 

When looking at the minutia of dialogue as a medium, we can see just how flexible and different two works, both ostensibly dialogues, can be. The series I'm working on will employ a wide variety of these narrative structures in an effort to approach ideas and character development differently, although the philosophical content and the characters themselves will appear in every dialogue. 

Plato vs. Hume: Character Depth

As we have noticed thus far, Hume's characters in his dialogues, namely Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea, are all more complex and less like mouthpieces than the characters of Berkley.

One thing I have noticed, however, is despite this depth, certain behaviors of Hume's characters do not connote the same level of profundity as that of Plato's characters. There is plenty of implied meaning behind, for example, Cephalus leaving the room in Book One of Republic, or implied conversion of Glaucon in Book Nine.

Why is this so? It is true that there is certain level of societal satire in Plato that doesn't seem to be present in Hume. We also know a good deal of historical biographical information about many of Plato's interlocutors that gives the characters perhaps a more authentic depth than that of fictional ones, at least in the case of Hume, and certainly Berkley. Moreover, there is also an omniscient tension in Plato's dialogues--almost all of them contain a hero that everyone listening or reading (even in the time of Plato) now knows to have been executed.

Given these added layers, the depth of Plato's interlocutors is much greater than that of Cleanthes, for example, yet is it even fair to compare the two?

'The Machine' on the Self and biological continuity

Our discussion on the star trek metaphysics in class reminded me of a philosophy comic that encapsulates the basic arguments surrounding the idea that we don't have biological continuity, and what that means with respect to the self.

'Comic,' per say, only refers to the medium of 'The Machine,' as it is much longer and dramatic, as opposed to shorter and comedic. In any event I think it illustrates the thought experiment quite well.

Hopefully this post, in conjunction with my last one, can spark more conversation about our collaborative effort to put our arguments on paper. 

http://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

Enjoy!

Berkley, Idealism, and Materialism

In class last Tuesday we had an discussion on the consequences (or not) of accepting the materialistic worldview--does it or does it not imply a deterministic one?

I thought our response was the best I've heard today, so I think it would be a good idea if I attempted to reconstruct it, and then everyone's comments, corrections, and criticisms could formulate a strong and tangible theory. I apologize for the length of the blog (I try to keep them short) but this one demanded a little more detail.

Here are the backbones of our discussion, as I remember it:

Does materialism force us to concede to a totally deterministic worldview?

That causal forces of the material world are in a sense, predetermined because everything that happens in the 'external' world is caused by an efficacious predecessor. Therefore, if we acknowledge that our minds are no less part of the materialistic world than a chair or table, we must admit the predetermined nature of all human behavior as well.

Responses: 

-We can accept that internalist-externalist dualism with respect to our minds is largely false, while at the same time recognizing the difference between our 'minds,' whatever that may be, and our brain, basically, the biological content of our physical bodies.

-Moreover, whatever we may define as our 'mind,' we may assert that it is an emergent property of our consciousness, our sociality, and so on, and at the very least, we maintain that mind is distinct from brain, and the latter is what is demonstrably linked to the external world simply by virtue of existing in it.

-This distinction allows us to refute the criticism that the contents of our minds are predetermined by the causal, external world--at best we can say that the external world, like any existing object or idea or thing, influences the mind, which is hardly binding in any deterministic way.

-The mind originates from the brain, which is part of the materialistic world, yet as an emergent property in some sense creates a new dimension to it--therefore the causality of the materialistic world does not become more complex, but rather, the mind expands causality to the point at which we can either refine the term or choose another one.

For example, imagine the causal forces of the physical, materialist world to be projected on a standard line graph, with an 'X' and a 'Y' axis. The emergent property of the mind, rather than existing on the graph, as say, the biological brain does, adds a third dimension to the graph, and thus prevents determinism from charting our 'predetermined' actions, on the original graph.

Finally, I would add that this argument in no way eliminates all elements of determinism in our lives; it merely refutes the challenge that materialism necessitates holistic determinism.

I've probably made some errors or omissions along the way, so I look forward to your comments!

Digression in Theaetetus

I was thinking about the digression in the Theaetetus that we discussed on Tuesday. It seemed that the allusion to the Republic, among other things, pointed to the fact that the potential of some knowledge was what differentiated Socratic skepticism with Protagorean relativism, and that these questions were important, not just to Socrates and star geometry students like Theaetetus, but to everyone.

Perhaps this point was the intent of the digression, and why Plato has Theodorus remark to Socrates that he followed and understood the digression much better. The conversations that Socrates and Theaetetus have may not be understood by all, but we all can certainly try, for the ramifications of their discussions affect us all.

Convoluted Passages in Theaetetus

In class today I brought up a hypothetical--that perhaps a way in which many Greeks listened to Plato's dialogues were in similar fashion to that of Euclides and Terpison in Theatetus. At the very least, Plato is telling us that some did.

The passage at 192 is one particularly sophisticated argument that I was referring to, and it seems to have lost even Theatetus. The possibility that Euclides and Terpison probably only heard this read aloud, and one time through, I think, gives an added meaning to aporia in Plato's dialogues. The confusion is not only induced in the characters, but surely a once through would have left most Athenians in a similar state of aporia, though certainly a different kind of confusion than the type that we encounter, after reading the dialogue over and over again. Thoughts?

The Dramatic Setting of Theaetetus

We talked at length today about Plato's reason for instituting the outer dialogue as a route to the inner one, and I'll present a theory I've taken the time to flesh out a little more. I want to tentatively argue that Plato creates a strong parallel between Socrates and Theatetus--the outer dialogue only makes this argument stronger.

To begin with, our interlocutors in the outer dialogue are Terpsion and and Euclides. Both are from Megara, and both have a vested interest in Socrates--they were both present at his execution (Phaedo, 59c). 

The time at which Terpsion and Euclides read the dialogue is at the death of Theatetus, and subsequently, the actual conversation took place just before the death of Socrates. Theatetus, like Socrates, has similar physical characteristics, laudable intelligence and character, and contains the same modesty with respect to knowledge and willingness to admit it in conjunction with an eagerness to learn more. Socrates clearly enjoys his conversations with Theatetus as well--his demeanor is very different from the Socrates that talks to Euthyphro outside the courthouse shortly thereafter. Moreover, both Socrates and Theatetus die courageous deaths at the hands of Athens, Socrates by Athenian grand jury, and Theatetus in fighting for Athens. 

There seems to be a good deal of evidence that suggests Plato's efforts to draw our attentions to the similarities between Theatetus and Socrates, especially in light of both the outer and inner dialogues taking place at the time of their respective deaths. Thoughts?