In class today, we discussed how various facets of Christian ideology stem from different writings or traditions. In particular, the general distaste for the body in some sects, Roman Catholicism included, stem from Greek thought.
This brought to mind one of the most prominent Christian theologian and philosopher of his time, St. Thomas Aquinas, who was very much a Platonist. Seeing Plato's analogies of the body as a microcosm of his Republic, and for virtually any other argument by analogy made by the character Socrates, this connection made perfect sense.
To respond in a question in class, perhaps Christianity in its early forms did appeal to Platonists like Aquinas, who saw underlining similarities in the moral teachings of Jesus and Plato. Of course, they are different in many aspects as well, but I think the similarities were enough for many scribal elites of the early centuries CE.
Thursday, February 28, 2013
CLP: A Response to Kennedy
In class today, we struggled to issue a Dworkinian response to Kennedy's critique. Here's the one I brought up in class, articulated slightly better-
Debasing Kennedy's assumption of the subtleties between adjudication and legislation:
Kennedy stipulates adjudication as applying the law, and legislation as making the law. Moreover, legislative intent is laden with political ideology, and most likely, partisan bias. Adjudication, he states, does not. While judicial decisions may make one party much happier than the other, he stresses that the process of reasoning itself is untouched by partisan ideological leaning, if of course, the judge is competent.
With that being said, how is can this distinction really be made? Dworkin does state that by mere virtue of reading and applying law, we interpret it, and when we interpret things, they are subject to our experiences, values, and presupposed notions of how things (or the law in this case) work. Can Kennedy really claim that even the best judges can steer clear of partisan bias, as if it can be immediately recognized and avoided? Bush v. Gore is a striking example of how the best judges in the country (and a relatively strong group in the history of the Supreme Court, I might add) can slip into the partisan rift. This argument is not so much defending Dworkin's, as it is attacking Kennedy's from the Dworkinian perspective.
I'm sure there does exist a much stronger Dworkinian response to Kennedy. Thoughts?
Debasing Kennedy's assumption of the subtleties between adjudication and legislation:
Kennedy stipulates adjudication as applying the law, and legislation as making the law. Moreover, legislative intent is laden with political ideology, and most likely, partisan bias. Adjudication, he states, does not. While judicial decisions may make one party much happier than the other, he stresses that the process of reasoning itself is untouched by partisan ideological leaning, if of course, the judge is competent.
With that being said, how is can this distinction really be made? Dworkin does state that by mere virtue of reading and applying law, we interpret it, and when we interpret things, they are subject to our experiences, values, and presupposed notions of how things (or the law in this case) work. Can Kennedy really claim that even the best judges can steer clear of partisan bias, as if it can be immediately recognized and avoided? Bush v. Gore is a striking example of how the best judges in the country (and a relatively strong group in the history of the Supreme Court, I might add) can slip into the partisan rift. This argument is not so much defending Dworkin's, as it is attacking Kennedy's from the Dworkinian perspective.
I'm sure there does exist a much stronger Dworkinian response to Kennedy. Thoughts?
Thursday, February 21, 2013
WR: John the Baptist and Jesus
It was really interesting reading about Jesus' relation with John, and how their two philosophies compared and contrasted with each other. Even more so, was observing the initial acceptance, for lack of a better word, on the part of John, by Jesus. Consequently, we see a much different message (compared to John's apocalyptic repentance) from Jesus after John's execution.
How much of an impact did John have on Jesus? Was Jesus loosely aligning himself with John's message as a political gesture, or did Jesus' views really do change?
How much of an impact did John have on Jesus? Was Jesus loosely aligning himself with John's message as a political gesture, or did Jesus' views really do change?
CLP: Dworkin v. Hart
In class on Tuesday, we discussed the basic principles of the jurisprudence of both Dworkin and Hart. We started creating the mock trial around Dworkin's example of a 'hard case,' Riggs v. Palmer.
One of Hart's biggest pros, which we discussed on Tuesday, was the idea that even a positivist can (partially) remedy hard cases, by creating more/specific laws that combat extenuating circumstances. Of course, I think we conclusively argued that this idea does not entail the creation of a law which states "no man ought to benefit from his own wrong." The political and moral charge in those words and their relative ambiguity would create nightmares for judges.
What Hart would argue would be to created laws or contracts which included a clause, specific to the beneficiary, which would prevent him or her from illegally acting to "legally," gain an inheritance.
Thoughts/new ground covered Thursday?
One of Hart's biggest pros, which we discussed on Tuesday, was the idea that even a positivist can (partially) remedy hard cases, by creating more/specific laws that combat extenuating circumstances. Of course, I think we conclusively argued that this idea does not entail the creation of a law which states "no man ought to benefit from his own wrong." The political and moral charge in those words and their relative ambiguity would create nightmares for judges.
What Hart would argue would be to created laws or contracts which included a clause, specific to the beneficiary, which would prevent him or her from illegally acting to "legally," gain an inheritance.
Thoughts/new ground covered Thursday?
Thursday, February 14, 2013
CLP: Liberty of Contract in Lochner
In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law limiting the hours an employer (John Lochner in this case) could require of his or her workers. "Liberty of Contract," was central in Justice Peckham's majority (5-4) opinion.
"...Under that provision no State can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment..."
Liberty of Contract, in this case, upheld the right of the workers to freely negotiate their own wages and hours; having legislation passed to protect their own safety was unconstitutional simply because it infringed upon their right to negotiate their own contract. Reading this today, I couldn't help finding the idea ironic, almost to a humorous point.
On another note, the beauty of having numerous justices on a court plays it's trump card when stare decisis is overturned, as the concept of "liberty of contract," later was. The dissenting opinions of other justices almost provide a cleaner and more decisive transition. In other words, usually, when precedent is overturned, the majority opinion falls upon a preexisting, and formerly, a dissenting one. In Lochner, I found Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion to be particularly ahead of his time (and a classic adherence to his personal philosophy of judicial restraint).
"This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain...I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement [of the economic theory] has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law...I think the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."
"...Under that provision no State can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment..."
Liberty of Contract, in this case, upheld the right of the workers to freely negotiate their own wages and hours; having legislation passed to protect their own safety was unconstitutional simply because it infringed upon their right to negotiate their own contract. Reading this today, I couldn't help finding the idea ironic, almost to a humorous point.
On another note, the beauty of having numerous justices on a court plays it's trump card when stare decisis is overturned, as the concept of "liberty of contract," later was. The dissenting opinions of other justices almost provide a cleaner and more decisive transition. In other words, usually, when precedent is overturned, the majority opinion falls upon a preexisting, and formerly, a dissenting one. In Lochner, I found Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion to be particularly ahead of his time (and a classic adherence to his personal philosophy of judicial restraint).
"This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain...I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement [of the economic theory] has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law...I think the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."
WR: Operating on Metaphysical Assumption
Our discussion in class this morning struck a resonant chord with me, particularly due to my consistent exposure to the methods in which academics study philosophers, or any academic for that matter. More often than not, when reading one particular scholar for an extended period of time, the professor will first direct students toward her or his metaphysical scholarship. For example, reading Plato makes a lot more sense when one is familiar with his Theory of Forms.
In no way am I comparing Plato with Crossan; I'm simply expressing the usefulness of operating on the same metaphysical assumptions of the scholar in which one is studying. It gives the student a much greater capacity for a charitable and insightful read of the author.
In no way am I comparing Plato with Crossan; I'm simply expressing the usefulness of operating on the same metaphysical assumptions of the scholar in which one is studying. It gives the student a much greater capacity for a charitable and insightful read of the author.
Thursday, February 7, 2013
WR: Chapter 11 in the Gita
In class today, we largely discussed chapter 11 of the Gita, and for good reason. Krishna reveals himself in his (infinite) totality, and evokes an grandiose measure of awe and terror from Arjuna. One passage in particular stuck out to me, however.
"I am time, the destroyer of all; I have come to consume the world. Even without your participation, all the warriors gathered here will die" (11.32).
I think this verse can come across as contradictory on the surface; Krishna seems to be proclaiming the eminent death of all, karma aside ("even without your participation..."). I think this verse is remarkably cohesive with the rest of the Gita, however. Krishna is a human incarnate of Vishnu, one of the gods, and in that sense, is "everything." Therefore, it makes perfect sense for Krishna to claim, "I am time..."
Moreover, if Krishna is time, and time (whether we like it or not) kills us, albeit, some slower or faster than others, it would still follow that Krishna is the destroyer of all. Even that line, although it seems grim, cannot be taken with adherence to the very first chapter, in which Krishna refers to physical, bodily, death, as the shedding of an old coat.
"I am time, the destroyer of all; I have come to consume the world. Even without your participation, all the warriors gathered here will die" (11.32).
I think this verse can come across as contradictory on the surface; Krishna seems to be proclaiming the eminent death of all, karma aside ("even without your participation..."). I think this verse is remarkably cohesive with the rest of the Gita, however. Krishna is a human incarnate of Vishnu, one of the gods, and in that sense, is "everything." Therefore, it makes perfect sense for Krishna to claim, "I am time..."
Moreover, if Krishna is time, and time (whether we like it or not) kills us, albeit, some slower or faster than others, it would still follow that Krishna is the destroyer of all. Even that line, although it seems grim, cannot be taken with adherence to the very first chapter, in which Krishna refers to physical, bodily, death, as the shedding of an old coat.
CLP: The Line of Best Fit
In class today, we spoke of the line of "best fit," as it pertains to legal theory. I think it is fairly obvious that this is a generalization, and in fact, the law and the principles that are factored into interpreting past law are very messy. With that being said, in the United States at least, in my opinion, the line of best fit can be best applied to our basic first amendment freedoms.
For example, our freedom of speech is a right which many think transcends circumstance; in other words, situations in which the circumstances are different can still expect (reasonably, of course) that one's freedom of speech, or expression, can be protected.
Of course, many points that the line of best fit surrounds are not on the line; some can be a good distance away. In the case of free speech in the US, we have found out over the centuries various limitations of speech. As a general rule of thumb, whenever this speech hinders the bureaucratic process of government (draft card burning) or whenever speech translates to action which presents "clear and present danger," we begin to see limitations. Moreover, speech has more restrictions (appropriateness, time and manner) when it comes to schools. All of these different cases, hypothetically speaking, would lie somewhere along the line of best fit that is the freedom of speech.
For example, our freedom of speech is a right which many think transcends circumstance; in other words, situations in which the circumstances are different can still expect (reasonably, of course) that one's freedom of speech, or expression, can be protected.
Of course, many points that the line of best fit surrounds are not on the line; some can be a good distance away. In the case of free speech in the US, we have found out over the centuries various limitations of speech. As a general rule of thumb, whenever this speech hinders the bureaucratic process of government (draft card burning) or whenever speech translates to action which presents "clear and present danger," we begin to see limitations. Moreover, speech has more restrictions (appropriateness, time and manner) when it comes to schools. All of these different cases, hypothetically speaking, would lie somewhere along the line of best fit that is the freedom of speech.
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